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                                                  Abstract                                                                                                                                                                  
We show the most relevant literature regarding the corporate governance system of Codetermination, which 
includes the presence of workers' representatives on the board. The aim is to thoroughly analyse the topic 
and to fill a gap present in the current literature, the absence of an updated and extensive literature review, 
which analyses both the theoretical and empirical perspective. This particular analysis allows one to see a clear 
picture of this sensitive issue of governance, mainly present in the German world, but expanding to other 
countries especially in northern Europe, also as a result of the recent European Union directives. 
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                                                         1.Introduction                                                                                                                                                      
When we speak about corporate governance, we usually think about a management system of 
a company whose sole aim is to optimize the wellbeing of shareholders, i.e. the subjects that 
confer physical capital and/or monetary into the company. The law in the United States 
mandates this and in the United Kingdom is the normal approach to the political governance. 
Therefore in these systems who generate human capital – the workers – do not have any 
representation on the board or be able to claim direct rights that the shareholders would 
normally be entitled to. An example is from the Ford Motor Company (Brealey, Myers and 
Allen, 2011). Henry Ford proposed to distribute a part of the dividends in favour of the 
workers. This was not possible because a shareholder pointed out that the company should be 
managed complying the interests of those who confer financial capital and a distribution of a 
dividend to the workers would have been a detriment to them. Nevertheless, in other countries 
the law and its uses are different. In Japan for example, the company is managed in the interest 
of the workers even if they are not physically present on the board (Allen and Gale, 2011). In 
Europe on the other hand, the representation of workers in some countries is provided for, 
especially in Germany, where the role of the worker is very important and valued in a company 
by the Codetermination system. But why would the shareholders want to divide their 
command of the company with the workers? First of all, the workers are also investors, they 
confer human capital rather than physical capital (Blair, 1995). Secondly, the workers’ presence 
on the board allows the shareholders to make more profitable decisions for the company in 
the long run, rather than making decisions that could risk the stability of the company, with 
consequences such as layoffs in the case of wrongful estimates. Basically this gives more 
certainty of progress in business activity (Gorton and Schmid, 2000) and therefore more job 
security, also guaranteeing the protection of those who have invested human capital into the 
company (Hart and Moore, 1990). Furthermore, the non representation of employees on the 
board could facilitate any protesting actions and therefore blocking all or part of production 
(Holmström, 1999). These situations are not only costly and inefficient but also bring with 
them in extreme cases, a reduction value of the company (Ruback and Zimmerman, 1984). 
Hence for this reason the presence of workers on the board of a company should reduce 
strikes, an advantage that does not have those workers represented only by labour unions 
(Fauver and Fuerst, 2006). Another reason is that the workers have daily contact with the 
management of the firm and therefore are more informed than the shareholders and they can 
guarantee a better level of monitoring (Kleinknecht, 2015). Lastly, the presence of the workers 
can ensure that the company is managed with more directness because the company gives to 
the workers a salary and therefore is the source of their existence and that of their families 
(Stiglitz, 1985; Hansmann, 1990). For this reason the workers' incentive of deviating the 
prospective that the personal wellbeing comes before that of the firm is notably inferior 
compared to the shareholders. Let us think about two important events of bankruptcy that 
have occurred over the years: Enron and Parmalat. Enron was a company that up to the year 
2000 had a market value of $60 billion. The following year it declared bankruptcy. Parmalat in 
2003 operated in 30 countries and accounted for 36,000 employees. In December 2003, it was 
discovered that €3.9 billion of bank deposits declared by the company did not exist. The 
investors found out later that the debts of the company were €14 billion. As we know there 
are other several cases of meltdown in the history. For this reason many researchers argue if a 
company should represent merely the interests of shareholders or a broader range of 
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stakeholders. Even the largest global public institutions are taking this into great consideration 
(Conchon, 2013). The European Parliament, in the Resolution of 14 June 2012 talking about 
the future of European company law, states: "the financial crisis has demonstrated the need 
for a clearer corporate governance framework which focuses more strongly on stakeholder 
participation".         
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2 presents a historical analysis 
about the concepts of corporate governance and codetermination, explaining how the current 
system is structured. Section 3 focuses on the analysis of the theoretical aspects of the topic, 
while section 4 provides the main empirical studies on codetermination. Finally, section 5 
concludes. 
        
2. Historical analysis and actual framework 
The first debate in literature about the objective of the governance’s model adopted for 
companies tooks place in the 30s between Professor Berle and Professor Dodd (Hill, 2003). 
Even though more than 80 years have gone since then, the topic is still present today. Berle’s 
vision (1931) is that management should operate the company in the exclusive interest of the 
shareholders with a purely economic perspective, in other words the maximisation of profits, 
a concept supported also by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Dodd (1932) sees a company as a 
system that merges the interests of various subjects, shareholders, workers, creditors, 
consumers. This shows that the company should be run by the management in the interest of 
all the counterparts, shareholders and stakeholders. Therefore, while in the vision of Dodd the 
management could adopt a decision more in the interest of the workers rather than the 
shareholders, providing that it brings more benefits for the company, this cannot happen 
according to Berle’s vision. These different views today are present in laws and uses in different 
countries. The European Union through the use of Directives is looking to increase the 
participation of workers in the decisions of companies. In some countries in the EU this is 
already happening (e.g. in Germany, through a Codetermination system), while in other 
countries the workers have only indirectly representation though labour unions (e.g. in Italy). 
So, we have two concepts which seem similar but in reality are very different: corporate 
governance and codetermination, where the latter represents a particular case of the first that 
for its particular conformation and peculiarity has separated from the first concept over time, 
taking on its own meaning. According to Blair and Roe (1999) "the main difference between 
them is that codetermination offers social governance, whereas corporate governance provides 
firm-level governance". While the concept of corporate governance was born in the United 
States with the publication of a paper by Berle and Means (1932), that of codetermination was 
born twenty years later around the start of industrialization. The first legislative form was 
created in the coal and steel sector in 1951 with the law on Montan-Codetermination, a law 
that is still in force today. It foresees that every company with over 1,000 employees has the 
same number of representatives on the board between workers and shareholders. In the 60s a 
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study sponsored by the German government started to analyse the effectiveness of the workers 
participation policy in order to value its extension to other sectors of production. The results 
were positive on both parts, the shareholders placing more attention on financial return and 
the workers mainly focusing on the working conditions. As a consequence, in 1976, Germany 
decided to extend this law on Codetermination to other firms outside the coal and steel sector. 
The argument was that: "it would empower employees who provide the production factor and 
thereby enable them to become equal partners in the capitalist production process" (Blair and 
Roe, 1999). As represented in figure 1, a codetermination system has two distinct levels of 
governance: the supervisory board and the management board. The first is formed by 
representatives of shareholders and workers and it has the task of electing the management 
board, establishing the reimbursement that it receives, conducting monitoring activity and 
eventually removing one or more members. On the other hand, the supervisory board cannot 
take decision on the daily management of company activity, because this is an exclusive task 
of the management board. In particular, in companies with more than 2,000 employees, the 
shareholders' meeting elects half of their own representatives, while the other half is nominated 
by the workers (parity codetermination). In smaller companies, the shareholders elect 2/3 of 
the board members, while 1/3 is nominated by the workers (quasi-parity codetermination). In 
the case of parity codetermination, fundamentally is the figure of the chairman that has the 
right to choose in the case of equal votes between the two parties. The chairman can be chosen 
amongst the workers or the shareholders; when the supervisory board cannot come to a 
majority agreement, such decision is left to the shareholders. However, despite shareholders 
have this power in their hands, the majority of the decisions are made unanimously (Gorton 
and Schmid, 2004). Regarding the representation of the members in the supervisory board, the 
majority of members elected by the shareholders can be narrowed down into four categories 
representing the characteristics of German equity capital: other companies with an equity stake 
exceeding 50 percent, banks, the state, and foreign companies. Regarding the workers’ 
representatives, the majority of places are taken up by workers from the same company and a 
smaller number is represented by the unions.      
 Before concluding this section, is important to underline three things about 
codetermination: first, unlike other countries that have voluntary employees’ representation, 
codetermination in German is imposed by the law and consequently, exogenous. Second, 
unlike shareholders, the workers inside the supervisory board have no cash rights. Third, 
codetermination is different from unionisation because the workers have an important power 
inside the firm, in fact they can directly influence the ex-ante and ex-post decisions of the 
firm's operations like for instance important layoffs or surplus distribution. 
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              Figure 1 (Jackson et al.,2002). German Codetermination system.      
 
3. Conceptual issues 
To study, analyse and fully understand the functionality of the codetermination system as a 
model of governance in a company, it is useful to compare it with the most widespread model, 
the Anglo-American one. Particularly in the US and UK, shareholders’ interest comes first and 
managers have a fiduciary duty to shareholders. In these countries there is a one-tier structure 
and firms can elect a single board of directors and not a dual board as in Germany, where the 
firm is run in the interest of stakeholders. So, in the US and UK the board invests both 
managerial and supervisory activities in a single entity traditionally divided between the 
executive directors and non-executive directors both elected by the shareholders. In Germany, 
however, the shareholders appoint only the supervisory board which in turn nominates the 
management board. This is an important first difference between these two systems of 
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governance. A second important difference is the size of the board that has been an important 
issue in the financial literature (see e.g. Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010). The boards of 
the most listed companies have in average 11.93 members in the UK (Jungmann, 2006), 10.8 
members in the US and 22.7 in Germany, 17.1 from the supervisory board and 5.6 members 
from the management board (Block and Gerstner, 2016). So, Anglo-American boards are 
much smaller than their German counterparts. The literature regarding the optimal size of a 
board in terms of performance of the company is conflicting. Eisenberg et al. (1998) argues 
that a board that is too big cannot adequately manage a company due to problems in 
communication and bigger coordination costs. Lublin (2014) comes to a similar conclusion 
with a study on board size and profitability of the biggest American companies, claiming that 
the value of a company that presents a smaller board is higher than 8.5% of competitors. The 
reasons behind this result are different, from a greater flexibility and frequency of board 
meetings, to a greater and more effective management monitoring and the easiness of 
replacement in the case of negative company performance. Also other data on board size 
seems to suggest that firms with smaller boards tend to outperform similar companies with 
larger boards in Asia (Mak and Kusnadi, 2005) and the United Kingdom (Guest 2009). On the 
other hand, other researchers have a different view. Kaplan (1994) suggests that the 
supervisory board is more effective in changing the management when the performance of a 
company is low, having closer contact with workers. Dalton et al. (1999) and Coles et al. (2008) 
argue that an ampler board can give better suggestions and advice improving the performance 
of the company. Jungmann (2006) compares smaller boards in the UK with bigger boards in 
Germany finding that there are not any particular differences that can give any strategic 
advantage to one or other system. It is clear that researchers do not have a unanimous position 
regarding this topic. If it could be true that a bigger board can create greater problems of 
coordination, it could also be true that a more varied presence of subjects different to 
shareholders in the board, each with a different background and information on the company, 
can benefit in a positive way in managing the company in a longer period. The absence of a 
unanimous position in research occurs also for the concept of codetermination. On one side 
there is an area of researchers who argue that the interest of workers on the board has great 
contrast towards that of shareholders. In fact, for the shareholders the primary interest is the 
monetary return of their investments, whereas for the workers the interests lie in their job role 
and their salary (Hansmann, 1990). Moreover, it is argued that the presence of workers could 
delay decisions in terms of planning and innovation of processes, looking to maximise their 
own interests and not those of the shareholders (Pejovich, 1978). Another element is that the 
presence of workers in the board requires competences in finance and corporate strategy that 
often they do not have and therefore, they are retained not qualified to cover such a role (Huse 
et al., 2009). In addition, according to Williamson (1975) it is not possible to reach an effective 
model of governance through a system of codetermination because it is imposed exogenously 
by the law. If it were efficient, then the shareholders would voluntarily adopt this model. Jensen 
and Meckling (1979) also support this view, and their opinion is very clear: "If codetermination 
is beneficial to both stockholders and labour, why do we need laws which force firms to engage 
it? Surely, they would do so voluntarily. The fact that stockholders must be forced by law to 
accept codetermination is the best evidence we have that they are adversely affected by it". On 
the other hand, there are researchers who believe the advantages deriving from 
codetermination surpasse the disadvantages (Boneberg 2010). Levine and Tyson (1990) 
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support the presence of workers on the board, because this gives them more responsibility, 
more motivation and therefore more involvement in business decisions. Freeman and Lazear 
(1995) suggest that the system of codetermination allows a better exchange of information 
between the board and workers. So, during any periods of crisis, codetermination allows a 
reduction of any probability of strikes and therefore a greater cooperation between 
shareholders and workers. Kleinknecht (2015) emphasizes that a greater diversity of a board 
can bring better decisions, increasing the quality of monitoring and making better decisions in 
the long run for the company, without thinking merely of short term profit. Kluge and Wilke 
(2007) supporting the Lisbon Strategy of European Union based on active workers’ 
participation, underline that countries with participation rights for employees, on average 
perform better in the rankings of the World Economic Forum’s Business Competitiveness 
Index (BCI) than those without this type of right. In particular, in Europe (see figure 2 from 
Conchon, 2013), in 19 countries employees have the possibility to have their interests 
represented in the administrative and management bodies, 14 of them with widespread 
participation rights. Countries like the UK, Belgium and Italy are exceptions. In Italy for 
instance there is the possibility to choose a two-tier structure, with a management committee 
(consiglio di gestione) and a supervisory council (consiglio di sorveglianza), but it differs from 
the German structure because labour representation is not mandatory (Mallin, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 (Conchon, 2013). Labour representation at the board level in the EEA. 
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The topic on the size and composition of the board and therefore the possibility of choosing 
a board that foresees the presence of workers is becoming a major theme. In fact, recently the 
EU’s adoption of the structure of Societas Europaea (SE) has led many European countries 
to change their national law, giving to the firms the possibility to choose among different board 
structure (Belot et al. 2014). It should also be noted a notable gap in the literature, the absence 
of a mathematical model that explains the functionality of a board in a system of governance 
of codetermination. Actually, there are various models that explain the functionality of the 
Anglo-American board, but the same does not happen for the German board. Forcillo (2017a) 
attempts to take the first step in this direction comparing the single board, typical of Anglo-
American firms, with the German system of codetermination. 
 
 
4. Empirical studies 
There are only a few studies about the effects of the German system of codetermination and 
no one has been done comparing American and German firms (Block and Gerstner, 2016). In 
the area of empirical studies this is an important gap in the literature. It is interesting to note 
that also the empirical results regarding this particular type of governance are often 
contradictory, with particular reference to the effects in terms of productivity and profitability. 
Cable and FitzRoy (1980) for example, analyse 42 companies in West Germany in 1974-1976, 
finding that a majority of worker participation in company activity increases the productivity. 
With reference to the same period of analysis (1976 represents the year of the extension to 
companies outside the coal and steel sector, in the equal representation of workers and 
shareholders in the board), FitzRoy and Kraft (1993) analyse the performance of 68 
companies, finding that change to the codetermination system reduces the average of 
productivity to 19,7% and increases the immobilism and job security. Nevertheless, a later 
study by the same researchers in 2005 on a greater number of companies, 179 in total, finds 
that the extension in 1976 to the parity codetermination had brought positive effects of 
productivity to the bigger companies. Freeman and Lazear (1995) support that 
codetermination increases productivity because the workers are more involved in the 
decisional process and therefore they have more incentive to work harder, but this reduces the 
profitability as a consequence of raised salaries that the workers require due to the larger work 
load. Similar results derive from a study by Boneberg (2010). Baums and Frick (1998) analyse 
the impact of the parity-codetermination using the methodology of event study without any 
significant statistical findings. Renaud (2007) examines the firms present in the German 
Financial Database between 1970 and 2000, analysing the differences in terms of productivity 
and profitability. The results indicate that with the transition from a quasi-parity to a parity-
codetermination, there is an increase in the value of both indicators. Petry (2009) otherwise, 
studying a sample of 140 firms before and after 1976, highlights a negative impact on the 
wellbeing of the shareholders with particular reference to a decline in the value of the share 
price. In addition, using another sample of 90 companies between 1998 and 2008, he 
underlines that firms that announce an increase in the number of representatives of employees 
in the board, endure a negative effect on the value of their share; vice-versa occurs for the 
firms that announce a reduction in the number. Analysing the change from a system of quasi-
parity to that of parity codetermination and the impact that this had in terms of productivity, 
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profitability or share value, it is easy to note that the results obtained often contrast among 
themselves, not showing a common vision among researchers on this topic. Two of the most 
important recent studies in terms of codetermination are surely those conducted by Gorton 
and Schmid (2004) and by Fauver and Fuers (2006). The first study examines a sample of 250 
of the biggest companies in Germany in the non-finance sector between 1989 and 1993, with 
the intent of comparing the effect of worker representation on the board of firms that present 
a quasi-parity codetermination with those that present a parity codetermination. The results 
show that companies with an equal representation of workers and shareholders on the board 
trade at 31% stock market discount and on average have a 55% greater salary than firms with 
1/3 representation. The main explanation for this effect is that the workers alter the objective 
function of the company, maximizing their own salary. So, for instance in the case of external 
shock, they obtain part of the shareholders’ surplus without understanding the exigencies of 
the shareholders that requiring the reconstruction of the company and eventual layoffs. The 
study of Fauver and Fuers is partially in contrast with this analysis. They examine a sample of 
firms listed in the stock exchange in Germany in 2003, demonstrating that within certain levels, 
the representation of workers on the board could increase the effectiveness of the company 
and its market value. They hypothesize an inverted U-shaped relation between firm value and 
employee representation. More precisely, in the first part of the curve, the presence of workers 
on the board gives two big advantages to the firm. There is a greater flow of information at 
the lower levels of the firm where the workers are, up to the high levels in the board. This 
therefore improves the decisions made. A second advantage originates from a better 
monitoring on the manager, protecting also the interests of the minority shareholders. 
Nevertheless, in the second part of the inverted U-shaped, the workers could acquire too much 
power thinking more about their salary than the value of the firm and creating a situation 
where the subjects that have to monitor in realty are those that need to be monitored. This 
analysis is also discussed by Forcillo, 2017a. In particular, he assumes the presence of a             
U-shaped between the choice of the codetermination structure and the single board with a 
high level of private benefits in the hands of the large shareholder. The presence of an inverted 
U-shaped instead is linked to the benefits that workers and firm could obtain in a system of 
codetermination, as Fauver and Fuers hypothesise. In the first part of the curve, there is an 
increase of benefits for the company and workers, in terms of more involvement in business 
operations, minor probability of layoffs and strikes. However, the workers have a monitoring 
cost to pay to allow for such benefits, a cost that is not supported in the single board. If this 
cost is low, the workers prefer a codetermination system as the benefits outweigh the 
disadvantages. When the cost becomes too high, the workers prefer the sole board because a 
high monitoring cost has a negative effect on their expected gains. Jungmann (2006) examines 
the financial performance (with four measures: loss for the financial year, loss of profits, 
abnormal negative share price performance and a dividend cut or omission) of 25 companies 
listed on the stock exchange between 1994 and 2003 in the UK and Germany. The objective 
is to conduct an analysis between these financial performances and the structure of their board, 
verifying the behaviour of the subjects that conduct monitoring in the case of poor 
performance obtained by the company. The conclusion is that it is not possible to designate a 
superiority to a type of governance, but in reality both of them have aspects that could be 
improved. For example, in the sole board the members have the problem of conducting 
managerial activity and, at the same time, monitoring this activity. This complication is not 
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present in the codetermination system, having two distinct boards that conduct these two tasks 
separately. On the other hand, the supervisory board presents the problem of obtaining clear 
information that has not been filtered by the management board, a problem not present in the 
one-tier system because despite some members of the board are executive directors and other 
non-executive directors, they all have access to the same type of information. Huse et al. (2009) 
conduct a study with regarding the presence of workers on the board using a data set of 
Norwegian firms. What they claim in their study is the importance of valuing not 'if' the 
workers can contribute to the board but 'how' they can do it. Through the results obtained, 
they suppose that the workers are able to give specific contribution with particular reference 
to corporate social responsibility and strategy control. More recently, a study by Kleinknecht 
(2015) that analyses data of 726 firms in Europe in the pre-financial crisis period, 2006-2008, 
sustains that the effectiveness of the board and participation of the workers depend on the 
business cycle and from the external context where the firm lies in the market. This is because 
the workers generally are risk averse of new investments out of the normal functions of the 
firm and this could cause a lower company value in periods of boom and economic growth, 
but at the same time, could represent security during periods of recession. The results in fact 
show that on average the level of Tobin’s Q is lower in firms that foresee the presence of 
workers on the board, but these firms lose minor value during periods of recession. This is 
due to the fact that workers being less risk averse than the shareholders could adopt a serious 
growth policy over a long period, without assuming too many risks to obtain profits in the 
short run, one of the main reasons for the last financial crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009). It is 
interesting to note that the same effects of workers’ participation on the board have not been 
found in the works councils, because they are not able to influence the ex-ante strategic choices 
of the firm.         
 To summarise, from the start of the new millennium, different studies focus mainly 
on quantitative indicator, like productivity and profitability, and on the change in 1976 from a 
quasi-parity codetermination to a system of parity codetermination. Nevertheless, despite the 
variety of studies most results are often contrasting, highlighting that at the moment, there is 
not a clear picture of the economic effect of codetermination on company performance and 
that a univocal view of this phenomenon is still lacking. 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
Analysing the theoretical and empirical literature, we cannot say which is the best system 
between codetermination and the single board (today the system of governance most 
widespread). From a theoretical point of view, some researchers claim that the Anglo-
American board has the advantage of being smaller and therefore, allows faster decision 
making, more flexibility and more frequent meetings of the board. At the same time, however, 
the question arises setting on a single board the activity of choice of investment decisions for 
the company and the monitoring part, a limit that does not have the system of 
codetermination. Also from the empirical point of view, the results are often incongruent and 
the adoption of the codetermination system highlights positive, negative, or even neutral 
results.  
 To answer whether it is better to prefer the governance system of codetermination or 
not, therefore, we should not rely solely on statistical or monetary analysis. The workers' 
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satisfaction, as well as the implementation of democratic principles in the economic system 
depend on the values and ambitions that our society wants to improve. Then, the question we 
should ask has to be: does the government want a company that is managed in the exclusive 
interest of the financial capital holders, or a company that represents also the interests of the 
human capital holders, such as the workers? If the corporate governance system creates 
disparities among agents of the firm, there would be more sociological considerations and/or 
political issues to do. These political issues involve questions such as "what kind of society do 
we want to live in?" (O'Connor, 2000). If we talk about a socially optimal governance system, 
in fact, we should talk about obtaining the social optimum for the whole system, rather than 
an individual profit, benefit, or other quantitative measures. Clearly, further analysis and 
research activities need to be addressed regarding the presence of workers in the system of 
corporate governance.  
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